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Federal Estate Tax: A Possible Exception in the
Application of I.R.C. Section 2041 to Testamentary
Powers of Appointment Held by Incompetent
Decedents
Under section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
property subject to a post-1942l power of appointment, exercisable in favor of a decedent or her2 estate, will be includedwhether exercised or not-in the taxable estate of the decedent
who "has" the power a t death.3 Ambiguity in the terms of
section 2041 opens a potential for inequitable results when the
section is applied to tax the estates of passive donees of testamentary, general powers of appointment who are suffering from permanent mental incompetency which, under state law,4prevents
them from exercising the power. Where the donee of a testamentary power is incompetent throughout the duration of the power's
e ~ i s t e n c eit, ~is questionable whether the power is "exercisable"
and whether the donee, in fact, possesses the power, as required
by the section. A study of cases deciding related problems helps
to define the issue, while a correlation of applicable legislative
and administrative pronouncements with relevant constitutional
language and policy considerations exposes the counterbalancing
that will be necessary to finally resolve it.

Although the specific issue under discussion has not been
satisfactorily resolved by the courts, opinions related to peripheral problems have revealed the judiciary's limited sympathies
for incompetent decedents. In the first of such cases, Hurd v.
1. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
2. As a consequence of the marital deduction, donees are most frequently women; this
Comment will use feminine pronouns to refer to them.
3. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2), (b)(l). For history, background, and general information regarding powers of appointment, see Allen, Use of Trusts and Powers of Appointment in
Estate Planning, 21 ARK.L. REV.15 (1967); Picket, Powers of Appointment as an Estate
Planning Tool, 26 N.Y.U.INST. ON FED.TAX.1435 (1968).
4. See notes 37-41 infra.
5. The fundamental question may be whether under the circumstances focused upon
by this Comment a power of appointment can be said to exist a t all, rather than whether
the power is excercisable, possessed, or vested. For lack of a better word, however, powers
will be described throughout as existing.

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

Commi~sioner,~
decided in 1947, the decedent created a trust and
appointed himself cotrustee. As trustee, he had the power to eliminate the share of a beneficiary.' The decedent did not resign, was
not removed, and was not adjudicated insane, although he was
incompetent for eighteen months prior to his death. The court
held that the trust was properly included in his estate because
"the power existed in his behalfs . . . and he could have been
removedM9as trustee under the terms of the instrument.
Seventeen years later in Round v. Commissioner, lo the decedent had established three trusts and retained a taxable power
in each." The instruments provided that upon the decedent's
incapacity, the corporate cotrustee would become the sole fiduciary.I2 Although the decedent had had a conservator appointed
to manage his affairs, the court refused to remove the trust property from his taxable estate. The court interpreted the instruments as requiring permanent incapacity and found that in the
absence of a permanent removal-i.e., an adjudication of insanity-the appointment of a conservator "was not the definitive act
called for" by Hurd and did not remove the possibility that the
decedent could have recovered and resumed his duties as cotrustee.13
The decedent in Commissioner v. Noel," the only related
United States Supreme Court case, retained a taxable power to
designate the beneficiaries of two insurance policies purchased
just prior to takeoff on his fatal airplane flight.15 The Court admitted the practical impossibility of exercising the power while
the decedent was in the air but declared it would not allow a
decedent's "fluctuating, day-by-day, hour-by-hour capacity" to
determine his tax liability: "Estate tax liability . . . depends on
6. 160 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947).
7. Taxation of the property subject to this power was predicated upon Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 1, 8 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 121 (now I.R.C. $ 2038(a)).
8. Under most state laws, a guardian can exercise an inter vivos power on behalf of a
ward. See notes 40-41 infra.
The term "guardian" will be treated in this Comment as synonymous with the terms
"conservator," "curator," "tutor," and "approval of the court." See generally F. LINDMAN
& D. MCINTYRE,
THEMENTALLY
DISABLED
AND THE LAW225 (1961).
9. 160 F.2d at 613.
10. 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
11. Taxation of the property subject to this power was predicated upon I.R.C. §§
2036(a) and 2038(a)(2). Id. at 595-96.
12. Id. at 591.
13. Id. at 593.
14. 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
15. Taxation of the property subject to this power was predicated upon I.R.C. §
2042(2). Id. a t 678.
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a general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to the
owner's ability to exercise it at a particular moment."16
An inter vivos power of appointment was involved in Estate
of Rebecca Edelman.17 In this case, the Tax Court stressed the
fact that the decedent had not been made a legal ward nor adjudicated incompetent. Under such circumstances, state case law
provided that an exercise of an inter vivos power by an incompetent would only be voidable, not void? As a result, Mrs. Edelman
retained at death a "valuable property right"l9 which the court
held was properly subject to taxation.
Townsend v. United Statesz0also involved an inter vivos
power of appointment. The decedent received the power in her
husband's will but was unable, physically and mentally, to exercise the power before her own death. The plaintiff contended that
the decedent's incompetency prevented her from "possessing" a
taxable power.21The court, in dicta, rejected this argument by
stating that "it is immaterial under the provisions of [section
2041(a)(2)] whether [the decedent] was . . . mentally capable
of exercising such power."22 The court went on to exclude the
property subject to the power from the estate because the donor's
will had not been probated before the donee's death.23
The Fifth Circuit in Estate of Bagley v. United Statesz4refused to exclude a testamentary power of appointment from the
taxable estate of a donee who died in a common disaster with the
donor. The dissent vigorously opposed "[tlhis inequitable result,"% alleging it was "not only inconsistent with the rationale
of federal estate taxation, but unjust and a deprivation of property without due process of law."26
The clearest comments on the subject were made by the
16. Id. at 684.
38 T.C.972 (1962).
Id. at 978 (citing Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927)).
Id.
232 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Tex. 1964).
Id. at 221.
Id.
. The court interpreted state law as requiring a devised estate to vest immediately
upon death. It concluded, however, that a power of appointment was not' an estate but a
personal privilege that would not exist until probate. Id. at 222. State laws in other
jurisdictions have not been interpreted to require this result. See, e.g., Estate of Bagley
v. United States, 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971) (construing Florida law); Jenkins v. United
States, 428 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.) (construing Georgia law), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
24. 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 1270 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1271 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
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Ninth Circuit in Fish v. United States;27the most direct discussion has been by a federal district court in Finley v. United
States.28These two cases, however, produced conflicting results.
In Fish, the decedent had the power to demand on a yearly basis
the income from a trust. She never exercised or released this
power. The Internal Revenue Service included the value of the
income in the taxable estate under the lapse provisions of section
2041.29Although so urged by the plaintiff, the court refused to
address itself to the questions of whether the decedent was incompetent or whether the power could have been exercised by a
guardian. The court held that it was "immaterial whether the
lapse occurred through a designed failure . . . or through indifference or incompetency of the decedent."30
In the startling 1975 Finley decision, the court declared that
the decedent who was incompetent throughout the existence of
the power, though never officially so adjudicated nor subjected to
a guardian, could not be deemed to have possessed the testamentary power of appointment a t her death.31The opinion, unfortunately, reads as though the court were unaware that it had come
to a novel conclusion. The court recognized its conflict with the
Ninth Circuit as expressed in Fish, but it claimed that Hurd,
Noel, and Bagley provided sufficient support.32The court concluded that the decedent's incapacity was distinguishable from
that of the decedents in Hurd, Noel, and Bagley. The decedent
in Finley could not have validly exercised the power, either alone
or through a guardian. Her incapacity was "legal,"33not fluctuating, temporary, or brief; it was not merely physical or situati0na1.~~
The decision in Finley may not have been as contrary to
precedent as it first appears. Although not specifically discussed
27. 432 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1970).
28. 404 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1459 (5th Cir. May
24, 1976).
29. 432 F.2d a t 1279-80.
30. Id. a t 1280.
31. 404 F. Supp. a t 204.
32. Id. a t 202-03 n.2.
33. By way of a footnote, the Tax Court in Estate of Freeman v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 202 (1976), suggested that Finley could be distinguished from prior cases on the
grounds that it involved a legal rather than some other disability. Id. a t 208 n.9. Presumably, the court felt that the disability in Finley was not simply physical or even mental.
The difference between a legal disability and a mere physical or mental one has never been
fully explored. It could be that a physical disability, as well as one based upon situation,
is both entirely an individual matter and one which theoretically could be overcome. On
the other hand, a legal disability is imposed by law and is subject to uniform application.
34. 404 F. Supp. at 204.
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by the court, the facts, as revealed by the briefs, approach the
fact situation suggested above35in which taxation under the
terms of section 2041 would seem most unwarranted. The decedent, Mrs. Whitlock, was mentally incompetent at all times during the existence of the power. She had no opportunity, not even
a limited opportunity, to exercise the power. The decedents in
Hurd, Edelman, and Fish each had some time in which they
could have exercised the power.36Even Mr. Noel had a few hours
on the plane and Mrs. Bagley a theoretical second in which his
or her power could have been exercised.
Not only was Mrs. Whitlock incompetent throughout the
duration of the power, but she also enjoyed no ownership rights
over the property prior to the creation of the power by her husband's will. In Hurd and Round, the decedents themselves executed the trust instruments creating their powers; moreover, the
property had been owned outright by them prior to its being
placed in trust.
Another distinguishing fact is that any attempt by Mrs. Whitlock to exercise her power would have been void, not just voidable. Her power was exercisable only by will, and lack of capacity
renders a will void.37On the other hand, under most state laws
an inter vivos power can still be successfully exercised regardless
of capacity, assuming the exercise is not later di~clairned.~~
It was
upon this distinction that the decision in Edelman was based.39
Finally, Mrs. Whitlock's power, being testamentary, could
not have been exercised by a guardian acting in her behalf.'O A
guardian's function is to manage the ward's property during life,
not to control its disposition at death."
A case for the exclusion of the appointive property from a
35. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
36. In Hurd, the decedent was competent for nearly four years during the existence
of the power. 160 F.2d at 611. In Edelman, the decedent was competent for three and onehalf years. 38 T.C. a t 974. In Fish, the decedent was competent for two years during the
existence of the power. 432 F.2d at 1279-80.
AND LEGAL
37. R. ALLEN,E. FERSTER,& H. WEIHOFEN,MENTALIMPAIRMENT
INCOMPETENCY
286 (1968).
38. Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY
Q 345 (1936).
39. 38 T.C. 972, 978 (1962).
40. Equitable Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 25 Del. Ch. 281, 18 A.2d 228 (1941);
Minnehan v. Minnehan, 336 Mass. 668, 147 N.E.2d 533 (1958). Cf. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945) (dealing with guardian's ability to exercise
an inter vivos power); In re Houghton's Estate, 118 Vt. 228, 105 A.2d 257 (1954) (dealing
with guardian's ability to exercise an inter vivos power).
supra note 37, a t 283.
41. R. ALLEN,E. FERSTER,& H. WEIHOFEN,
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decedent's estate would be even stronger if several additional
facts could be established. For instance, if a decedent was incompetent at the time the donor's will which created the power was
drawn, it could be argued that the donee (1) could not have
(2) could not have
agreed to the donor's plan for the pr~perty,'~
approved the donor's chosen takers-in-default, and (3) could not
have changed her will to exercise the power. Before now, cases
have just considered the decedent's incompetency after the power
had been put into effect by the donor's death. Moreover, if such
a decedent had attempted an inter vivos exercise of the power or
had attempted to execute a will exercising it, a court may be more
easily persuaded that taxation would be unwarranted. An official
adjudication of insanity or the appointment of a guardian may
also affect the result.43
Although the present weight of precedent leans heavily in
favor of taxation in the type of case here postulated, it is by no
means clear that taxation is required in every instance.'' There
42. For the view that the fact a decedent did not request a gift of the property in
question "in no way affects the outcome" of tax disputes, see Peoples Trust Co. v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1156 n.5 (3d Cir. 1969). Presumably, a donee who has no capacity to
exercise a power is also rendered unable to disclaim it. See I.R.C. Q 2518(b)(2) (granting
a minor nine months following his attainment of legal capacity to disclaim powers given
to him). It may be possible for a guardian to disclaim a testamentary power if the facts
establish that the disclaimer will not alter the succession of the property, see Minnehan
v. Minnehan, 336 Mass. 668,671, 147 N.E.2d 533,535-36 (1958), and that the ward would
have disclaimed the power himself if competent. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 598 (1945). The authority of a guardian, even with court approval, is still doubtful in most jurisdictions, however, because a showing of benefit accruing directly to the ward is usually required before the guardian is allowed to dispose of or
alter property. For a thorough discussion of the problem, see Fratcher, Powers and Duties
of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWAL. REV.264, 315, 317-18 (1960).
43. See Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590,594 (1st Cir. 1964); Estate of Rebecca
Edelman, 38 T.C. 972, 978 (1962); Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 C.B. 384, 385.
The outcome of a pending case in the District Court of the Western District of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Bank & Trust v. United States, No. 76-155 (W.D. Pa., filed
Feb. 2, 1976), may provide additional insight into the importance of various fact combinations. In that case the decedent, Mrs. Brice, was alleged to have been hopelessly and
incurably incompetent beginning six years prior to the donor's death and continuing until
her own death. Following the donor's death, she was adjudicated incompetent and a
guardian was appointed. The plaintiff claims that this incompetency prevented the decedent from possessing a taxable power of appointment. A will executed by Mrs. Brice ten
years before her death and two years before becoming incompetent, however, evidences a
calculated release of the power. The will states: "It is not my intention to exercise by any
of the provisions of this Will any Power of Appointment which I may have under the Will
of my husband, James W. Brice, or any Power of Appointment which I may have."
Further, it would appear that the decedent's guardian could have exercised the power
during Mrs. Brice's lifetime since it included an inter vivos power to consume.
44. A case subsequent to Finley dealing with an analogous problem has failed to
resolve the Finley question whether there may be an exception to the application of Q 2041.
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are gaps between the cases which have not been fully addressed.
The contours of this unresolved issue are not yet defined.

Specifically how the gaps in present law will be, or should be,
filled is a matter of some dispute. Reference to the legislative
history of section 2041, the interrelation of that section to other
sections of the Code, applicable rulings and regulations, certain
constitutional language, and policy considerations provide a basis
for analysis of the conflicting views.
A. Legislative History
The 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
made it clear that Congress was not unaware of the problem of
donees under legal disabilities. The amendments included, for
the first time, unexercised powers of appointment in the taxable
estate unless "the donee of such power is under a legal disability
to release such power, until six months after the termination of
such legal di~ability."~~
The Senate Report accompanying the Act
summarized this provision, stating that the amendments would
be "inapplicable to an existing general power held by a person
under legal d i ~ a b i l i t y . "It
~ ~is obvious from this language that
incompetent donees can hold or possess powers of appointment;
otherwise, the specific exclusion of these powers from the scope
of the statute would not have been necessary. Since Congress
could have excluded powers held by incompetent donees in the
current version of the statute, the fact that it did not may indicate a present intent to tax these powers.
In 1951, Congress enacted the Powers of Appointment Act4'
for the express purpose of simplifying the treatment of powers
created prior to 1942. Under the old law, an unexercised pre-1942
power was subject to some complicated exceptions, including the
Estate of Freeman v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 202 (1976). In Freeman, the court observed:
"Regardless of how we might be disposed to treat a situation wherein a disability precluded a decedent donee from exercising a general power of appointment, under tte
circumstances of this case we fail to see how any 'disability' existed. . . ." Id. a t 208
(footnote omitted).
45. Revenue Act of 1942, § 403(d)(2), ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798,944 (1942) (amending Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 121). This provision regarding legal disability does not appear to have been repealed and has been partially codified into 4
2O4l(a)(l)(B)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
46. S. REP.NO. 1631, Pt. 2, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1942).
47. Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 4 2(a), ch. 165, 65 Stat. 91, 92 (1951).
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exception for persons under legal disability mentioned above.
After the change, pre-1942 powers were only taxed if exercised,
although post-1942 powers continued to be taxed whether exercised or not.48The evils flowing from the old law were described
in the Senate Report accompanying the Act: "[Mlany such powers [were not] discovered until it [was] too late for the donees
to do anything about them. . . . [Tax revenues came] from the
~~
unwary or those who [were] powerless to help t h e m s e l ~ e s . "The
Report, however, went on to approve the treatment of post-1942
powers even though incompetent donees of post-1942 testamentary powers are by definition "unwary" and by state law
"powerless to help t h e m s e l ~ e s . " ~ ~

B. Marital Deduction
A thorough examination of the interplay between the marital
deductions1and powers of appointment is also useful in assessing
the likely resolution of this issue. The purpose of the marital
deduction was to equalize the incidence of estate tax in community property and common law jurisdiction^.^^ In community
-

48. The rationale for taxing an unexercised power was explained by the dissent in
Bagley, 443 F.2d at 1271 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting): "A decedent who has knowingly
permitted such a power to lapse a t his death has exercised the privilege of directing the
course of the property subject to it, as surely as if he had taken the formal steps necessary
to exercise the power itself." Another commentator has described a taxable unexercised
power as a power which the holder "refrains from exercising." Allen, supra note 3, at 17.
The degree of volition necessary is an interesting question. In a case concerning a pre1942 power (where exercise is a prerequisite to taxation), the court refused to hold that
the decedent had exercised the power when his attempt was a "complete nullity which
from its very inception was devoid of legal significance." Estate of Edith Wilson Paul, 16
T.C. 743, 749 (1951). This is true, the court reasoned, especially when the attempt was
nullified not just by a unique local law but also by the law in numerous common law
jurisdictions. If an attempt by an incompetent or his guardian would not be an exercise
of the power, it follows that inaction in such circumstances would not equal a forbearance
from such exercising.
49. S. REP. NO. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [I9511 U.S. CODECONG.&
AD. NEWS1530, 1531.
50. Courts have demonstrated a tendency to be unsympathetic with the "unwary,"
however. In Estate of Freeman v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 202 (1976), the Tax Court refused
to exempt from taxation the value of trust property even though the decedent was totally
unaware of his power to terminate the trust and withdraw the property.
51. I.R.C. 4 2056.
52. Northeastern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 219 (1967); United
States v. Stapf, 375 U S . 118, 128-29 (1963). Excluding testamentary powers qualifying
for the marital deduction in the donor's estate from the taxable estates of incompetent
donees will not create a benefit in common law states greater than that allowed in community property states. Since a surviving spouse receives community property outright
and, if incompetent, may dispose of it in voidable transactions or through a guardian,
there is no equivalent situation in community property states.
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property states, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the
community property tax free." Using the marital deduction, a
surviving spouse in a common law state can receive an amount
of property equal to the larger of one-half of the decedent's estate
or $250,000 without the imposition of a tax.54To qualify for the
marital deduction, property left to the spouse must be subject to
her ultimate control.55A general power of appointment trust is a
device frequently used to qualify property for the marital deduction without thrusting the burden of managing the property on
the surviving spouse. In creating a power of appointment trust
with the marital deduction in mind, the parties are usually willing to accept an inevitable tax on the donee's estate in order to
avoid a tax on the donor's estate. Generally, the husband dies
first, and his estate is much larger; absent the marital deduction,
the progressive estate tax would impose a greater burden upon his
estate than upon his wife's estate. Deferment of the tax also
means the use of tax dollars in the interim and, frequently, a
reduction in tax caused by depletion of the taxable property.
The Internal Revenue Code does not state that section 2041
(governing general powers of appointment) and section 2056 (governing the marital deduction) are to be reciprocal in effect .56 However, "Congress' intent to afford a liberal 'estate-splitting' possibility to married couples, where the deductible half of the decedent's estate would ultimately-if not consumed-be taxable in
the estate of the survivor, is unmi~takable."~~
53. See generally W. BURBY,
CASESON COMMUNITY
PROPERTY
309-11 (4th ed. 1955).
54. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(l)(A).
55. In order to qualify for the marital deduction, property must meet certain prerequisites. For instance, the property interest devised must not be terminable. A general
power of appointment is a special exception to the terminable interest rule. If the donee
beneficiary of a trust has the right to all of the income, payable at least annually, and
the right to appoint the principal to herself or her estate, the trust property will qualify
for the marital deduction, absent some other factor. Treas. Reg. $ 20.2056(b)-1 (1958);
Fisher & Kohl, The Present Status of Powers of Appointment, Including Their Utility and
Limitations in the Marital Deduction, 24 N.Y.U. INST.ON FED.TAX.381, 398 (1966).
56. In fact, Treas. Reg. 4 20.2041-l(b)(2), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, warns that no
provision of 8 2041 should be construed to limit the application of another Code section
or regulation. In Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955), appointive property that failed to qualify for the marital deduction was not exempted from a second tax
in the donee's estate. The court refused to construe § § 2056 and 2041 as permitting only
one tax on the property. Id. at 166. Accord, Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d
1156, 1162-63 (3d Cir. 1969). Contra, Security-Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.
Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Strite v. McGinnes, 215 F. Supp. 513, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
aff'd, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964).
57. Northeastern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 221 (1967). Evidence of
this congressional intent can be found in the Senate Report that accompanied the bill
enacting the marital deduction. The Report described the deduction as applying in "such
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If powers otherwise qualifying for the marital deduction in
the donor's estate would escape taxation in the donee's estate
should the donee become incompetent, the Service would, no
doubt, take an interest in foreclosing the use of the marital deduction in such circumstances. If the Service chose to deny the marital deduction in the donor's estate whenever the donee was incompetent-either unable to exercise the power at all or without
the help of a guardian-it could do so under the literal language
of existing regulations. One of the specific prerequisites for the
marital deduction stated in the regulations is that the power of
appointment be exercisable by the surviving spouse "alone and
in all events."58At least one court has interpreted this language
as precluding the use of the marital deduction when a guardian
would be required to effectively exercise the power.5g
An understanding of the marital deduction also provides useful insight into the intent of the parties in creating powers of
appointment. This intent has significant bearing upon the equities of individual cases. When estate plans are the product of the
mutual efforts of a husband and wife, the takers-in-defaults0
listed in the husband's will are probably the wife's choice as well.
There is generally no incentive for her to exercise the power even
if she were capable of doing so. If couples so intend, they should
be able to plan for maximum tax benefit without fear that the use
cases where the value of the property over which the surviving spouse has a power of
appointment will (if not consumed) be subject to either the estate tax or the gift tax in
the case of such surviving spouse." S. REP. NO. 1013, Pt. 1, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16,
reprinted in [I9481 U.S. CODECONG.
& AD. NEWS1163, 1238.
58. Treas. Reg. 4 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
59. Estate of Stockdick v. Phinney, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 6202 (S.D. Tex. 1965). One commentator has also suggested that "alone" means "presumably . . . without the approval
of a court." Fisher & Kohl, supra note 55, a t 406.
The Service has thus far refused to interpret the "alone and in all events" language
of the regulation as precluding use of the marital deduction when the surviving spouse
cannot exercise her power due to incompetency. Rev. Rul. 75-350, 1975-2 C.B. 367, states
that "[tlhe phrase in all events does not refer to those events that State law has determined to be sufficient to deprive a person of control of his or her property during a period
of physical or mental incompetency." Id. a t 368. The reason for this, as given by the ruling,
is that anyone could possibly become incompetent a t sometime; consequently, no power
of appointment would ever qualify for the deduction. The allowance or denial of the
marital deduction, however, must be predicated upon facts known a t the donor's death.
See Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964). Alternatively, a change in status
of the donee within the statute of limitations could, if sufficiently permanent, be the basis
for recomputing the tax. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 200, 201 (S.D.
Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1459 (5th Cir. May 24, 1976).
60. "Takers-in-default" are the persons designated by the donor to receive the property after the donee's death if the power is not exercised by the donee.
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of the marital deduction will be automatically precluded by the
incompetency of the

C . Administrative Pronouncements

Rulings
Though congressional intent may be variously construed, the
Service has left no doubt as to its view of when a decedent's estate
should be taxed. In Revenue Ruling 55-518,62the Service first
announced its position that a decedent possessed a taxable power
of appointment even though she was incompetent "at all times''
during the existence of the power.63The ruling, however, dealt
with an inter vivos power that was exercisable by the decedent
with approval of the court. Although the ruling declared that
taxation was predicated upon the existence of the power distinguishable from the capacity to exercise it," the particular facts
of the ruling imply a relationship to capacity because the power
was still exercisable with approval of a court."
Revenue Ruling 75-35066is particularly on point. There the
Service concluded that a testamentary power of appointment created in the husband's will is included in the wife's estate notwithstanding both her incompetency at all times during the existence
of the power and her legal inability under state law to exercise it:
"In the absence of a stated condition in the instrument requiring
termination of the power of appointment, the practical inability
of the wife to exercise it (due to her legal incapacity) did not
affect the existence of the power at her death."67
The Service suggests in Revenue Ruling 75-350 the comparison between appointive property and property owned outright.
The ruling correctly asserts that no form of incapacity exempts
property owned outright from the throes of estate tax? It is,
however, possible to distinguish property held outright and prop1.

-

-

-

-

61. It has been suggested that the executor of the donee's estate be allowed to choose
between taxation through application of 8 2041 to the donee's estate or through loss of
the marital deduction in the donor's estate with the tax amount taken from the property
in question. Comment, Estate Taxation: Powers of Appointment and Common Disasters
L. REV.778,
IJnder Section 2041(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 23 U . b.
784 (1970).
62. 1955-2 C.B. 384.
63. Id. at 385.
64. Id.
65. Id. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
66. 1975-2 C.B. 367.
67. Id. at 368.
68. Id.
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erty subject to a testamentary power of appointment. First, the
identity of the ultimate takers of the property owned outright is
determined, if there is no valid testamentary document, by the
laws of intestate succession. The decedent's blood relatives will
generally receive the property. In the case of appointive property,
however, the donor's will which created the power will frequently
designate takers-in-default who might not bear the remotest relationship to the decedent. Second, disposal of property owned outright is not limited to testamentary disposition. Inter vivos transactions entered into by incompetents, such as contracts to sell or
gifts, are generally only voidable. Further, such transactions can
be validly completed by a guardian. Any attempted exercise of a
testamentary power of appointment by or on behalf of an incompetent would be totally ineffectual?
2. Regulations

While the regulations make no direct statement on the issue,
they do provide useful insight into the necessary prerequisites for
taxation. Although not readily apparent on an initial reading of
the statute, not every general, vested, post-1942 power of appointment "exists" for tax purposes. For instance, a power "by its
terms" conditioned upon an event or contingency that did not in
fact occur is not included in the taxable estate under the regulat i o n ~Powers
. ~ ~ subject to a binding agreement prohibiting their
exercise are also not included." Consequently, the broad sweeping language of the statute cannot be taken literally.
Of even greater significance is the fact that the statute has
been interpreted not to tax a power invalidated by certain state
laws.72The courts as well as the regulations recognize that in
some contexts an interest must be valid under state law before it
can be subjected to federal estate tax. Although invalidation by
state testamentary capacity and guardianship laws has never suf69. See notes 37-41 supra.
70. Treas. Reg. Q 20.2041-3(b) (1958).
71. Estate of Cook v. Commissioner, 29 TAXCT. MEM.
DEC.(CCH) 298, 300 (1970).
72. C.LOWNDS,
R. KRAMER,
& J. MCCORD,
FEDERALESTATE
AND GIFT
TAXES§ 12.11,
at 316 (3d ed. 1974). The relationship between federal and state laws in this context was
described in Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940): "State law creates legal
interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed." See also Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 414 (1943). The
extent and scope of property interests or powers is also determined by state law. Miller v.
United States, 387 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1968); Picket, supra note 3, a t 1439-40. Local law
will also affect a determination for marital deduction purposes. Treas. Reg. Q 20.2056(b)5(e) (1958).
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ficed to remove a power from taxation,73it is arguable that it
should. The dissenting opinion in Bagley somewhat reflected this
analysis. In distinguishing a prior case, the dissent asserted:
If, as a matter of state law, any document executed [by the
donee] could have had no present or future legal effect, the
Court would have had to conclude that [she] died without ever
having had the privilege of disposing of the property, and hence
that the value of the property could not be taxed to her estate.74

D. Constitutional Language
A constitutional look at the problem, framed in both direct
tax and due process terms, has been suggested in several cases.75
The Constitution prohibits a direct property tax levied without
app~rtionment.'~
The estate tax is said to avoid this prohibition
because it is an excise tax" levied on an action, privilege, or event
rather than directly on the property. It has been argued that when
the decedent is deprived of any possibility of control, the estate
tax loses its excise quality and becomes a prohibited direct tax
upon the appointive property.78In recent times, courts have consistently rejected this direct tax arg~ment.~"hey have had no
problem conceptualizing the estate tax as a levy upon the hap73. The important question, under the current state of the law, is whether testamentary capacity and guardianship laws wipe a power out of existence or just prohibit its
exercise. If it is the latter, the power is not invalidated, though nullified and, as such,
could still be a taxable interest. Taxation would then be predicated on whether the federal
statute is interpreted as taxing only viable powers.
74. 443 F.2d 1266, 1271 (5th Cir. 1971) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
75. In Finley, the court's holding obviated any need to address the constitutional
argument raised by the plaintiff. 404 F. Supp. at 204 n.3. The plaintiffs failure to raise
constitutional objections in a timely manner precluded judicial determination of them in
Edelman, 38 T.C. a t 978-79, and in Freeman, 67 T.C. a t 206 n.3. The majority in Bagley
ignored the constitutional implications raised by the dissent. See 443 F.2d a t 1271 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
A due process argument was briefly discussed in Jenkins v. United States, 428 F.2d
538 (5th Cir. 1970).The court insisted that since the property interest vested in the donee
a t the time of the donor's death, taxation of the property in the donee's estate was not a
denial of due process even though the donee died seventeen days later. Id. a t 549-51.
76. U.S. CONST.art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
77. C. LOWNDS,
R. KRAMER,
& J. MCCORD,
supra note 72, 5 1.2, a t 2. See generally
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 577 (1895) (citing Scholey v. Rew,
90 U S . 331 (1874)).
78. Brief for Plaintiff a t 2, Finley v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.
Fla. 1975).
The estate tax is not infrequently described as a levy on a privilege. See, e.g., Estate of
Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943); Jandoffs Estate v. Commissioner, 171
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1948).
79. For a recent and clear denunciation of this argument, see Estate of Freeman v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 202, 206-07 (1976).
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pening of an event, namely death, or upon the receipt of the
property by the survivor.80
Another constitutional argument is that the donee's estate is,
in effect, improperly taxed for the exercise of the donor's privilege. When the takers-in-default are designated in the donor's
will and the donee cannot effectively appoint others, the donor is
never divested of control over the property. The Supreme Court
has invalidated a state income tax law that included a wife's
income with the husband's for tax purposes, holding that "any
attempt . . . to measure the tax on one person's property . . . by
reference to the property . . . of another is contrary to due process of law."81This argument again assumes that the basis of the
estate tax is control by the decedent. If, however, the event of
death or the maturation of the beneficiaries' interest accrues the
tax, the argument fails. It would seem, though, that in such instances the tax should be extracted from the value of the property
and not from the residual of the donee's estateY

E. Policy Considerations
When, as in this instance, the cases have left doubt as to
what result would be required by law and that doubt is not eliminated by an examination of legislative history, related sections of
the Code, rulings, regulations, or constitutional language, it is
helpful to reduce the problem to policy terms. Considerations of
judicial economy, ease of application, and fairness are especially
relevant here.
Courts are particularly sensitive to the administrative burdens suggested by making taxation turn on the competence of the
decedent. In a footnote, the Fish court commented, "We note
parenthetically that if the position contended for by the taxpayer
were adopted, the result would be an open invitation to contest
80. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U S . 194, 198 (1960); Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497,
502-04 (1930); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,57 (1900); Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d
998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1941).The tendency in these cases is to evaluate the tax from the point
of view of the ultimate takers of the property. Their interest ripens a t the death of the
previous owner regardless of her competency or her control over the property. Evaluating
the tax from the position of the takers is not inappropriate. It is they who can be made
liable for the amount of the tax under I.R.C. 8 2207; the decedent is beyond the reach of
the Internal Revenue Service at last.
81. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r, 284 US.206, 215 (1931).
82. I.R.C. tj 2207 allows the executor to require the takers of the property to pay the
tax thereon "[u]nless the decedent directs otherwise in his will. . . ." Unfortunately,
clauses providing for the payment of the estate taxes out of the residuary of the estate or
some other fund are very common.
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the competency of the decedent in every similar case. . . ."83
Similarly, in Noel, the Supreme Court shunned the suggestion
that tax law should be based on tenuous and fluctuating circums t a n c e ~possibly
,~~
because such criteria would require extensive
litigation. In Bagley, the court refused to tie taxation to the probate of the donor's will possibly because the court interpreted
congressional intent to mean that the delays and inconsistencies
of probate also render it "so tenuous"85 a basis for taxation.
One response to the argument of administrative convenience
would be to limit special treatment to estates of decedents whose
disability was not fluctuating but permanent throughout the period in question. Practical disability may well be too variable,
short-term, and temporary to be the basis of taxation; legal disability would be a more easily administered criterion. Of course,
posthumously proving the lack of capacity necessary to establish
legal disability could be most challenging?
Another policy concern is that of simplicity of application.
When i t changed the treatment of pre-1942 powers, Congress
stated that the treatment of post-1942 powers was already simple,
clear-cut, and easy to apply." Although special treatment for
incompetent decedents caught in the certain pattern of circumstances described in this Comment would add one more complication to the law, it would be far from the only complication that
has been allowed under existing law. As discussed above,88there
are exceptions carved out for powers expressly subjected to contingencies, restricted by binding agreements, or invalidated by
state law.
Finally, it runs amiss of our sense of justice to tax the estate
83. 432 F.2d a t 1280 n.3.
84. 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1965).
85. 3 GA.L. REV.766, 770 (1969).
86. In the past, the Commissioner has been willing to stipulate to the decedent's
incompetency, thus avoiding the problem of proving capacity. If the decision of the court
could turn upon the decedent's competency, this spirit of cooperation would be dispelled.
E. FERSTER,
Some of the problems involved in proving capacity are illustrated in R. ALLEN,
& H. WEIHOFEN,
supra note 37. Appointment of a guardian, involuntary hospitalization,
and determination of a contractual incapacity during the decedent's life are not conclusive
of a lack of testamentary capacity. Id. a t 253-54, 291. In recognition of these problems
perhaps, the Louisiana Civil Code, art. 403, provides that the validity of acts cannot be
contested after death on grounds of insanity unless the decedent's condition (1) was
pronounced or an adjudication thereof petitioned while he lived, (2) was not manifest until
ten days before his death, or (3) can be proved by the act itself. LA.CIV.CODEANN.art.
403 (West 1952).
87. S. REP. NO. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [I9511 U.S. CODECONG.&
AD. NEWS1530, 1531.
88. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
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of a decedent for property from which she received no prior enjoymentagand over which she could exercise no control. The dissent
in Bagley found it inequitable to tax property when there was no
The true
opportunity for the decedent to alter its dispo~ition.~~
injustice, however, does not lend itself to remedy through the tax
laws. The husband's takers-in-default, not the persons desired by
the decedent, obtain the property whether the decedent's estate
is taxed for the property or not. If the tax amount is extracted
from the value of the appointive property, the passage of the
property through the estate causes little harm, particularly to the
decedent.

An exception to the strict application of section 2041 in cases
involving permanently incompetent donees of testamentary powers is arguably justified and may find acceptance in the courts.
The weight of precedent favors taxation regardless of circumstances, but no case besides Finley directly addresses these exceptional facts. Congressional statements intimate a sympathy for
unwary decedents and those under legal disabilities, but the
wording of the statute contains no clear protection for them. The
rulings insist upon taxation while the regulations, on the other
hand, open a slim possibility for exception. Such an exception's
appealing sense of fairness and justice is not well supported by
specific constitutional mandates and must be weighed against
the policies of administrative convenience and simplicity of application. The greatest concern of estate planners, though, is
probably the effect such an exception would have on the use of
the marital deduction. There is the chance that exclusion of appointive property in donees' taxable estates will automatically
trigger denial of the marital deduction in donors' estates, even
though the use of the marital deduction would obtain a greater
tax savings overall. Most importantly, though, those involved in
the planning stages of estates should be aware of the possibility
that an exception exists, the exact parameters of which are unknown .@I
89. Of course, a power of appointment trust that qualifies for the marital deduction
will include a right to the income of the trust payable at least annually. Unless the right
to the income is allowed to lapse, the donee definitely receives a benefit from the property
during her life.
90. 443 F.2d at 1270-71 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
91. Rev. Rul. 75-351,1975-2 C.B. 369, discusses the parallel problem of a minor donee
of a power of appointment. According to the ruling, a minor's estate includes a testamen-
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tary power of appointment although, by reason of local law, the minor was precluded from
executing a valid will and thereby from exercising the power. The incapacity of a minor
can only be distinguished from the facts treated by this Comment on the basis of permanence. In the rare but possible situation where the donor of the power had reason to know
a t the time the power was drafted that the minor donee would never gain capacity-i.e.,
if he were suffering from a terminal illness-the equities bearing upon a decision to tax
the minor's estate for the appointive property would follow those discussed herein.

